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Abstract
Based on a new survey of German households, we investigate the role of information
channels and lifetime experience for households’ inflation expectations. We show
that the types of information channels that households use to inform themselves
about monetary policy are closely related to their socio-economic characteristics.
These information channels, in turn, have an important influence on the level of
perceived past and expected future inflation, as well as uncertainty thereof. The
expected future change of inflation and the unemployment rate, however, is strongly
influenced by individual experience of these variables. Similarly, the expected re-
sponse of inflation to a change in the interest rate is also shaped by experience.
We propose the interpretation that households obtain inflation numbers from the
media, but their ‘economic model’ is shaped by experience.
JEL-Codes: E31, D84, E71
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1 Introduction
What determines households’ inflation expectations? Considering that the answer is of
high importance to monetary policy, relatively few studies have empirically taken up this
question until recently. Moreover, most studies on this topic – see below for an overview –
employ US data only. Presumably, data limitations are to blame for this research gap. In
this paper, we take an explorative look at a new and large survey of German households,
conducted in 2019 by the German central bank, with a focus on the role of information
channels (e.g., traditional media or social media) and experiences for shaping households’
inflation expectations.1 We find that both play a role, but for different aspects of how
expectations are formed.
Expectations of economic variables can vary across households because of different
information sets, or due to alternative views on the workings of the economy, i.e., the
‘economic model’ entertained by households. We find that socio-economic characteristics
are related to the information channel used primarily by households to inform themselves
about monetary policy. This channel, in turn, plays an important role for what house-
holds expect about the level of past and future inflation, controlling for other household
characteristics. Specifically, consumers of traditional media such as newspapers or televi-
sion have lower and, thereby, more accurate views of inflation over the last year, as well
as lower inflation expectations for the coming year. They are also less uncertain about
future inflation than households who do not inform themselves about monetary policy.
These results can be rationalized by a high information content and a comprehensible
presentation in traditional media. Lifetime experience does not play an important role,
arguably because this experience is not remembered in the form of numerical values. In
contrast, households that inform themselves about monetary policy via social media dis-
play higher uncertainty regarding future inflation. As discussed in Bundesbank (2019),
this latter finding suggests that central banks should increase their social media presence
to facilitate the spread of accurate information via this channel.
For expectations regarding the direction of future of inflation, instead, lifetime expe-
rience of inflation turns out to be highly relevant. The higher the inflation experience
of an individual, the more likely is the individual to expect inflation to increase over
the next twelve months. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that experiences,
rather than information channels, influence individuals’ economic model, i.e., the way
how agents think about the basic mechanics of the economy. This is confirmed by our
observations regarding the expected direction of the unemployment rate, and the answers
to a thought experiment, in which the European Central Bank unexpectedly raises inter-
1Lagarde (2020) outlines the importance of both economic expectations of the public and communica-
tion about monetary policy for the ECB. Given that direct central bank communication has difficulties to
change households’ inflation expectations (Lamla and Vinogradov, 2019), other communication channels
might be crucial to fill this gap (Lamla and Lein, 2014). Binder (2017) also finds that expectations of
more informed individuals react more strongly to monetary policy announcements.
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est rates. When asked for the effects of such a change in interest rates, consumption of
traditional media loses its importance. Experience has again a much stronger influence
on expected linkages of economic variables. Specifically, individuals who have experienced
higher inflation over their lifetime expect inflation to rise after an increase in the interest
rate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature. Section 3 presents the data set. Section 4 investigates the determinants of
households’ information channels, while Section 5 investigates the role of information
channels and experience on inflation expectations. Section 6 analyzes the effect of a
hypothetical change in the policy rate on inflation expectations. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper relates to the literature on the determinants of households’ inflation expecta-
tions. In particular, we contribute to the evidence on the role of information channels
and experience on individual expectations.2 Using a survey of Dutch households, van der
Cruijsen et al. (2015) find that knowledge about the ECB’s objectives is quite limited.
Similarly, Lamla and Vinogradov (2019) observe no general effect of FOMC meetings
on household expectations in the US. Andre et al. (2019) present households with hy-
pothetical exogenous shocks and find strong deviations of adjustments of households’
expectations from those of economic experts. Household behavior follows a pattern in
which variables co-move that households consider as ‘bad’ or ‘good’. Rather than using
information about central bank actions, households seem to form inflation expectations
based on their observations during grocery shopping, according to D’Acunto et al. (2019).
This also creates a significant gender gap in inflation perceptions (D’Acunto et al., 2020).
However, if confronted with alternative information treatments about current and next
year’s interest rates (but not if treated with longer horizons), households significantly
adjust their inflation expectations (Coibion et al., 2020).
An early study that, among other things, investigates the channels that US households
use to inform themselves about economic issues is Krueger and Blinder (2004). Television
and newspapers are the two most frequent and most important sources of information. In
one part of their analysis, Kumar et al. (2015) relate the employed information channels
of firm managers in New Zealand to their perceived and expected inflation, as well as their
estimate of the central bank’s inflation target. They find that those managers that have
the most accurate view on the inflation target primarily use television and newspapers to
inform themselves and users of media have the lowest error for actual inflation. Coibion
et al. (2019b) go one step further and test the reaction of households’ inflation expectations
2Early studies have often focused on the socio-economic determinants of inflation expectations, see,
e.g., Jonung (1981) and Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010).
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to different forms of information about inflation. Reading the FOMC statement has
approximately the same effect on households’ forecast revisions as just providing the
FED’s inflation target. Compared to these information channels, the reaction to reading
news articles is about half.
Regarding the role of experience, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) have triggered a grow-
ing literature on the effects of individuals’ economic experience on their behavior by show-
ing that people who have witnessed lower stock market returns in their lifetime have more
pessimistic return expectations and participate less in the stock market. In Malmendier
and Nagel (2016), the authors find that individuals overweigh inflation that occurred
during their lifetimes. Young individuals hence update their expectations more strongly,
which is also documented by Mertens et al. (2020) for the impact of surprise changes in
the Federal Funds target rate on household confidence. For Germany, Goldfayn-Frank
and Wohlfart (2020) show that East Germans expect higher inflation, most likely due to
higher experienced inflation rates after re-unification.
Evidence on how households form inflation expectations is economically important,
given new evidence that these expectations have a bearing on actual household decisions.
While Bachmann et al. (2015) found a small correlation between expected inflation and
readiness to spend, Coibion et al. (2019a) use randomized information treatments about
expected inflation and observe large negative effects of higher inflation expectations on
durable spending. This effect seems to be driven by a more pessimistic view about real
income in case of higher inflation expectations. Vellekoop and Wiederholt (2019) find
that households with higher inflation expectations save less.
3 Data
Our analysis is based on data from the Bundesbank Online Pilot Survey on Consumer
Expectations which was conducted in April, May and June 2019 and covers a representa-
tive sample of the German population.3 In each wave, individuals were asked about their
quantitative expectations on inflation, their qualitative expectations on inflation and the
unemployment rate, and other macroeconomic figures. The data also contain detailed
information about the respondents’ socio-economic characteristics. In our analysis, we
focus on the subset of individuals who participated in the third wave (June 2019). To this
wave, we contributed a question on the information channels through which individuals
take notice of the ECB’s monetary policy.
3For details on the process of how the respondents were selected, see Bundesbank (2019).
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3.1 Socio-economic characteristics
We use information about the socio-economic characteristics of individuals who partici-
pated in the third wave as control variables. The survey targeted individuals of age 16
and older. The average age is 53. We consider indicator variables for individuals living in
East Germany shortly before the reunification (east1989), gender (female), full employ-
ment (fullemploy), whether the individuals intend to buy a house in the next 10 years
(homebuy) and whether individuals do not own real-estate (no property). In addition, we
use information about household size (hhsize), income (income) and years of education
(yoe). Further details on the construction of the variables are provided in Tables A.1-A.2
of the Appendix. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A.3.
3.2 Information channels
We contributed the following question on the information channels about the ECB’s
monetary policy.
Q:314: Via which of the following channels do you most often receive
information about the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy? Please
select all answers that apply.
• Traditional media such as newspapers, radio, television or the websites of
such providers
• Social media such as Facebook or Twitter
• ECB communication channels (e.g., ECB’s website, ECB’s Economic Bulletin,
ECB’s monthly press conference)
• Other sources
• I do not follow the ECB’s monetary policy
Among the 2,591 households in Wave 3, 2,585 answered Question Q:314. 85% of
the respondents state that traditional media is among the most important information
channels through which they they receive information about the ECB’s monetary policy.
6% of households use social media, 6.3% rely on direct communication channels of the
ECB and 12.9% use other information sources. Only 10.4% of households do not inform
themselves about monetary policy. The majority of respondents (70.8%) state that they
receive information about monetary policy through a single information channel. 16.8%
of respondents use two information channels. Hardly any respondent uses three or four
information channels (1.9% and 0.1%).
The upper left panel in Figure 1 provides information about the information channels
that respondents rely on when conditioning on the overall number of channels that are
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used. The panel shows that among those individuals who state that they use a single
information channel, 95% rely on traditional media. Respondents who use two information
channels still predominantly rely on traditional media (94%), followed by other sources
(53%). For those individuals who use two information channels, the frequency of social
media and direct ECB communication channels is more than 25%. The upper right panel
shows that the usage of traditional media increases with age, while social media is most
popular among those younger than 30 years. The lower left panel indicates that men are
more likely than women to use traditional media and that 16% of women (vs. 7% of men)
do not inform themselves about monetary policy. The lower right panel shows that the
likelihood of using traditional media increases with income and that the percentage of
individuals who do not receive information about monetary policy is the highest among
low-income households (26%).
Figure 1: Conditional distribution of information channels
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3.3 Survey-based expectations data
The Bundesbank survey elicits different types of inflation expectations. First, the survey
asks for a point prediction of the rate of inflation over the past twelve months.4 We
consider those point predictions as the perceived inflation, pii,t−12:t|t, of each household.
Second, each individual is asked for a point prediction of the rate of the inflation over the
next twelve months, pii,t:t+12|t. We refer to pii,t:t+12|t as expected future inflation. Summary
statistics for pii,t−12:t|t and pii,t:t+12|t can be found in Table A.4 in the Appendix. Following
Bundesbank (2019), we focus on individuals with expectations in the range of -12% to
12%. For those individuals, the mean of perceived inflation is 2.53%. This contrasts with
an actual inflation rate over the May 2018 to May 2019 period of only 1.4%.5 That is, on
average households overestimated the actual inflation rate. In the following, we denote
the individual perception errors by ei,t−12:t|t. The expected inflation over the next twelve
months is 2.50% on average.
Besides the point predictions, the Bundesbank survey also asks for histogram forecasts
for the rate of inflation over the next twelve months. For each individual, we compute the
standard deviation, σi,t:t+12|t, of the histogram forecast and use it as a measure of inflation
uncertainty.
Finally, the survey asks questions in qualitative form. We employ questions about ex-
pected changes in inflation and the unemployment rate to better understand the economic
model that individuals have in mind when forming expectations. Individuals are asked
whether they believe that the inflation/unemplomyment rate will decrease significantly,
decrease slightly, stay roughly the same, increase slightly or increase significantly. We re-
classify the answers as -1, 0, 1 whereby -1 stands for a slight/significant decrease, 0 for no
change and 1 for a slight/significant increase. We denote the qualitative inflation and un-
employment expectations by infl exp and unemp exp. For summary statistics see Panel B
of Table A.4. The qualitative inflation expectations are well aligned with the quantita-
tive expectations: for individuals with −12 ≤ pii,t:t+12|t ≤ 12, the conditional means of
expected inflation are 1.65%, 2.16% and 2.74% when the qualitative expectations are -1,
0 and 1.
3.4 Time-series data
In order to compute lifetime experiences of inflation and unemployment rates, we make
use of annualized aggregate time series for West-Germany from 1950 until 2019. The
data on inflation is provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank and refers to the German
CPI, seasonally and working-day adjusted. Unemployment data is taken from the Federal
Employment Agency of Germany and refers to the official unemployment rate based on
4This question was only asked to participants of Wave 3 of the Bundesbank survey who did not already
participate in Wave 2.
5We compute the inflation rate based on the German CPI (“Verbraucherpreisindex, VPI”).
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civilian dependent employment. There have been several distinct phases in the historical
evolution of inflation and the unemployment rate in Germany since 1950. After WWII,
unemployment came down from high levels, while inflation was slowly increasing. It re-
mained high and volatile in the 70’s, fell in the 80’s, and has remained low and relatively
stable since the mid-1990s. Unemployment rose in the 70’s, peaked in the late 1990s,
and has fallen since. Given these developments, it is conceivable that households with
different lifetime experiences of inflation and unemployment have different views of the
future development of both variables. Malmendier and Nagel (2011, 2016) have formally
shown that individual experiences matter for the formation of expectations. We follow
the methodological approach in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) and model inflation expe-
rience as a weighted average of the inflation rates that materialized during an individuals’
lifetime. Specifically, the inflation experience of individual i is given by
p˜ilti,2019(λ) =
agei−1∑
k=1
wi(k, λ)p˜i2019−k, (1)
where p˜i2019−k is the annual inflation rate in (West) Germany in year 2019− k and
wi(k, λ) =
(agei − k)λ∑agei−1
k=1 (agei − k)λ
. (2)
We restrict λ to be non-negative. For λ > 0 the weights are declining from lag one onwards.
This is in line with the empirical observation that individuals are usually influenced most
strongly by recent inflation experience (Malmendier and Nagel, 2016). Nevertheless, for a
sufficiently small λ individuals can attach considerable weight even to observations that
lie in the distant past. In the extreme case when λ = 0, all lags receive the same weight
and, hence, p˜ilti,2019(0) is the simple average of the inflation rates during the lifetime of an
individual. Additionally, we compute the lifetime experience of the unemployment rate,
u˜lti,2019, in the same way as described above for inflation.
In the empirical analysis, we estimate either linear regression models or Probit models.
We estimate those models for a fixed value of λ and then search over a grid of λ values for
the one that either minimizes the sum of the squared residuals (linear regression models)
or maximizes the log-likelihood (Probit models).
4 Determinants of Information Channels
In a first step, we study in detail the determinants of each household’s most important
information channels regarding monetary policy. For each information channel, we esti-
mate a Probit model that relates the choice of the information channel to the households’
socio-economic characteristics. Motivated by the upper and lower right panels in Figure 1,
we include age and age2 as regressors as well as the log of income. The average marginal
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effects (multiplied by 100) are presented in Table 1. The first column shows that the prob-
ability that an individual uses traditional media increases with age, household income and
years of education. For example, the predicted probability for the usage of traditional
media is 66.52% for a 20-year-old individual but 93.30% for an 80-year-old individual.
Thus, switching from a ‘young’ to an ‘old’ individual increases the likelihood of using
traditional media by 26.78 percentage points (denoted by ∆P(y = 1|X) in Table 1). In-
creasing household income by one percent raises the probability of using traditional media
by 5.52 percentage points. In addition, women are less and individuals with more years of
education are more likely to rely on traditional media. As expected, younger individuals
are more likely to rely on social media. In contrast, the probability that an individual uses
direct communication channels of the ECB increases with age. Interestingly, individuals
who intend to buy a house are more likely to inform themselves through direct channels
of the ECB. This suggests that households that might take a mortgage loan monitor the
ECB’s interest-rate decisions more carefully than other households. Younger individuals,
individuals with lower education, lower household income, females and those who do not
intend to buy a house are more likely to not inform themselves about monetary policy.
5 Inflation Expectations
Next, we investigate whether information channels and/or individual experience can ex-
plain inflation expectations. In all regressions, we include dummies for the four informa-
tion channels traditional, social, ecb and other. Those individuals who state that they
do not inform themselves about monetary policy serve as the reference group. For all
individuals, the inflation experience in Equation (1) is based on West-German historical
inflation rates. That is, we assign West-German inflation rates also to individuals who
lived in East Germany before 1989. Nevertheless, in order to control for their specific
experience we include the east1989 dummy in all regressions.
5.1 Quantitative expectations
5.1.1 Point predictions
The first three columns of Table 2 show the results of linear regressions of the point
predictions for perceived inflation (pii,t−12:t|t), the absolute perception errors (|ei,t−12:t|t|),
and the future expected inflation (pii,t+12:t|t) on the information channels and individual
inflation experience while controlling for socio-economic characteristics.6 Columns (1)-(3)
show that the only information channel which has a significant effect is traditional media.
6Due to the cross-sectional nature of our data set, we cannot include age dummies as done in Mal-
mendier and Nagel (2011). If we did, these dummies would capture the effect of lifetime experience of
inflation. Instead, we leave out age controls in the baseline and resort to cohort dummies in a robustness
check, as suggested by Malmendier and Nagel (2011) for cases of multicollinearity. As we discuss below,
including cohort dummies does not affect our results.
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Table 1: Information channels and socio-economic characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
traditional social ecb other noinform
age 0.39*** -0.17*** 0.15*** -0.09 -0.27***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
east1989 -3.06 0.24 -2.40* 2.26 1.73
(2.19) (1.41) (1.31) (2.10) (1.88)
female -6.61*** -0.51 -0.92 -5.56*** 7.91***
(1.54) (0.96) (1.04) (1.40) (1.38)
fullemploy -1.08 -0.10 2.94** -1.88 0.59
(1.84) (1.20) (1.45) (1.83) (1.59)
hhsize -0.66 0.60 -0.79 -0.28 0.55
(0.79) (0.48) (0.67) (0.81) (0.68)
homebuy 2.10 -0.48 6.41*** 3.88** -3.20**
(1.70) (1.16) (1.82) (1.97) (1.34)
ln(income) 5.52*** -1.24 1.12 -1.87 -3.86***
(1.63) (0.95) (1.45) (1.68) (1.36)
no property -0.17 1.55 -0.70 -3.67** 1.36
(1.61) (1.11) (1.25) (1.57) (1.40)
yoe 0.73*** -0.09 0.00 0.49** -0.52***
(0.23) (0.15) (0.15) (0.20) (0.20)
Observations 2,307 2,307 2,307 2,307 2,307
% correctly predicted 65.76 74.99 59.90 59.73 65.06
∆P(y = 1|X) 26.78 -12.38 8.81 -5.35 -18.87
Notes: This table presents average marginal effects from Probit regressions of households’ in-
formation channels on their socio-economic characteristics. The underlying regression model
includes age and age squared. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in
parentheses. The reported average marginal effects and standard errors are the estimated ones
times 100. Asterisks ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical
level, respectively. The estimation sample includes individuals with −12 ≤ pii,t:t+12|t ≤ 12. In
the second-to-last row, we report the fraction of correct predictions for each information chan-
nel. In the last row, we report the difference in the predicted probability of using a particular
information channel for a 20- and an 80-year-old individual.
For individuals who use this information channel, perceived inflation is on average 0.55
percentage points lower than for those individuals who do not inform themselves. Further,
as shown by Columns (2) and (3), users of traditional media have significantly lower
absolute prediction errors and expect significantly lower rates of inflation for the future.
Both results remain significant if perceived inflation is included as a control variable, see
Columns (1) and (2) in Table A.5 in the Appendix. Hence, utilizing traditional media
does not only lower perceived inflation, but also makes it more accurate. Additionally,
usage of traditional media reduces inflation expectations even more than what is implied
by the effect of lower perceived inflation on expected inflation. It should be noted that
the insignificant estimates for the other information channels may be partly driven by
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the fact that the number of households that rely exclusively on these information sources
is relatively small. Lifetime inflation experience does neither affect perceived inflation,
perception errors nor future expected inflation.7
Table 2: Regressions of expectations on information channels and lifetime experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pii,t−12:t|t |ei,t−12:t|t| pii,t:t+12|t σi,t:t+12|t infl exp unemp exp
traditional -0.55*** -0.57*** -0.51*** -0.34** -0.03 -0.02
(0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.03) (0.03)
social 0.16 0.15 0.27 0.54*** 0.01 0.05
(0.27) (0.25) (0.22) (0.20) (0.04) (0.04)
ecb 0.04 0.17 0.01 0.07 -0.06 0.05
(0.24) (0.21) (0.19) (0.17) (0.04) (0.04)
other -0.03 -0.10 0.06 -0.09 -0.02 0.07**
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03)
p˜ilti,2019 0.30 0.28 0.91 -0.70*** 0.45***
(0.31) (0.28) (0.73) (0.12) (0.13)
u˜lti,2019 0.11***
(0.02)
Constant 3.96*** 3.97*** 3.66*** 5.06***
(1.11) (1.00) (1.23) (0.75)
Observations 1,309 1,309 2,307 2,317 2,305 2,306
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
λ 1.70 1.60 5.10 0.20 4.40 2.70
R¯2 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.04 – –
% correctly predicted – – – – 61.95 49.96
∆P(y = 1|X) – – – – 12.59 9.72
Notes: Columns (1)-(4) present OLS estimates from regressions of households’ quantitative expectations
on their sources of information about monetary policy, lifetime inflation and socio-economic characteris-
tics. Columns (5)-(6) present average marginal effects for an increase (=1) in the respective dependent
variable from ordered Probit regressions of households’ qualitative expectations on information channels,
lifetime experience and socio-economic controls. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Asterisks ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, re-
spectively. The estimation sample in Columns (1) and (2) includes individuals with −12 ≤ pii,t−12:t|t ≤ 12.
Columns (3), (5) and (6) include those with −12 ≤ pii,t:t+12|t ≤ 12. Column (4) includes all individuals.
In the second-to-last row, we report the fraction of correct predictions for each qualitative expectation.
In the last row, we report the difference in the predicted probability of stating a one when comparing an
individual with experience at the 90th percentile with an individual with experience at the 10th percentile.
7The finding that lifetime inflation experience does not matter for the quantitative inflation expec-
tations is robust to several alternative specifications. For example, we assigned East-German inflation
rates (which were officially always close to zero) to individuals who lived in East Germany before the
reunification or, alternatively, imposed that their inflation experience “begins” with the reunification.
Contrary to our results, Malmendier and Nagel (2016) find that lifetime experience matters for inflation
expectations. This contrast might be due to either the different countries under investigation or the
imposition of an AR(1) process for perceived inflation dynamics in Malmendier and Nagel (2016).
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Note that we control for each household’s socio-economic characteristics. For brevity,
detailed results are omitted from Table 2 (the detailed estimates can be found in Table
A.6 in the Appendix). In line with the previous literature, we find that females have
higher perceived inflation, larger perception errors and higher expected future inflation.
In contrast, years of education have a significantly negative effect on all three variables
(see, for example, Bruine de Bruin et al., 2010). The no property dummy is significantly
positive in Columns (1) and (2), while higher income tends to go along with lower future
expected inflation, see D’Acunto et al. (2019). We also find that the east1989 dummy is
significantly positive in Column (3), which is in line with the findings in Goldfayn-Frank
and Wohlfart (2020).
5.1.2 Inflation uncertainty
In Column (4), we explore the effects on inflation uncertainty. We find that individuals
who rely on traditional media are significantly less uncertain than those who do not inform
themselves. Interestingly, we also find that individuals who use social media are more un-
certain. According to Bundesbank (2019), the data from all three waves of the survey
suggest that individuals with higher inflation uncertainty have less stable and potentially
de-anchored inflation expectations. Hence, as discussed in Bundesbank (2019), our finding
that users of social media are more uncertain about future inflation suggests that central
banks should disseminate accurate information through channels other than traditional
media. Moreover, higher lifetime inflation experience significantly reduces inflation uncer-
tainty. This finding could be explained by the empirical observation that higher levels of
inflation typically go along with higher inflation variability (see, for example, Conrad and
Hartmann, 2019). Individuals who have experienced phases of high inflation might there-
fore be more certain about the inflation outlook in the current low-inflation environment.
The estimate of 0.2 for λ implies that individuals take into account inflation experiences
from large parts of their life when asked for the possible range of future inflation.8
In addition, we find that men are significantly less uncertain than women and that
individual uncertainty decreases with income and years of eduction. The fact that indi-
viduals with higher income are less uncertain complements the finding in D’Acunto et al.
(2019) that household income explains the expected inflation rate.
8As a robustness check, we also re-estimated Column (4) with an alternative measure of inflation
uncertainty as the dependent variable (see Column (3) in Table A.5). Kru¨ger and Pavlova (2020) propose
a new uncertainty measure for histogram forecasts, which they call ‘expected ranked probability score’
(ERPS). The ERPS is solely based on the probabilities that an individual assigns to each bin and does
not require further assumptions (such as mass-at-midpoint). When using this new uncertainty measure,
however, all results remained unchanged.
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5.2 Qualitative expectations: directions of change
Column (5) of Table 2 presents the average marginal effects from an ordered Probit regres-
sion of the qualitative inflation expectations on information channels, lifetime inflation
experience as well as control variables. We report marginal effects on the probability
that individuals expect a slight or significant increase in the inflation rate. It turns out
that information channels are no longer relevant when explaining directional changes in
inflation expectations. Instead, lifetime inflation experience plays a crucial role. The
optimal λ is estimated to be 4.4. This estimate implies that the weights in Equation (2)
decline quickly for a 20-year-old individual while an 80-year-old individual will attach
non-negative weights to inflation rates over the last 40 years. The left panel in Figure 2
shows how inflation experience affects the predicted probability for expecting a slight or
significant increase in the inflation rate. For example, for an individual with an inflation
experience of 1.31% (which corresponds to the 10th percentile) the probability is 55.66%
and for an individual with an experience of 1.59% (which corresponds to the 90th per-
centile) the probability is 68.25%. Hence, the difference in the predicted probabilities
when moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile is 12.59 percentage points. That is, in-
dividuals who have experienced higher inflation rates are more likely to expect an increase
in the inflation rate.9 Concerning the control variables, we again find that individuals who
lived in East Germany before the reunification are more likely to expect an increase in
the inflation rate.
Figure 2: Predicted probabilities as a function of experience
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.15
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.35
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Notes: The figure shows the predicted probabilities (green line) and corresponding 95% confidence
intervals (grey shaded) for increases in the inflation rate (left panel) and the unemployment rate (right
panel) as a function of lifetime experience. The predictions are based on the estimates in Columns (5)
and (6) of Table 2.
9The results in Column (5) of Table 2 are robust to including cohort dummies, constructed as in
Figure 1. Specifically, Column (4) in Table A.5 shows that lifetime inflation experience remains significant.
In addition, when including cohort dummies, we find that usage of traditional media is still significant
in the regressions for perceived and expected inflation while inflation experience remains insignificant
(results available upon request).
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5.3 Summary and interpretation
Our findings are so far consistent with the following interpretation. Households learn
about the level of current and future inflation rates mainly from traditional media, but
individual inflation experience is key for explaining the expected change in inflation. In
order to understand whether this finding applies more generally, we also investigate the
determinants of the expected changes in the unemployment rate. As Column (6) shows,
the lifetime unemployment experience plays a crucial role for explaining the expected
change in the unemployment rate. The right panel in Figure 2 shows that the predicted
probability of expecting an increase in the unemployment rate increases with the life-
time unemployment experience. Additionally, individuals who rely on other information
channels (e.g., personal interactions) have higher unemployment expectations. Thus, our
analysis of the unemployment rate reveals a similar picture as for the expected change in
the inflation rate.
Our interpretation of these findings is that traditional media channels are important
for gaining an accurate picture of the current state of the economy, i.e., for obtaining the
correct figures. However, information channels either do not convey an economic model
of the workings of the economy or households do not absorb this information. Instead,
the economic model which is used by households to forecast future developments appears
to be shaped to a large degree by their own experiences.
6 Response to Changes in the Policy Rate
In order to learn more about the ‘economic model’ that households implicitly use when
thinking about the economy, we investigate how individuals respond to a monetary policy
shock. Specifically, we contributed a question to the survey that asked households how
they would update their inflation expectations in response to an unexpected increase
in the policy rate by the ECB. There were two randomly assigned versions of this question:
Q:311A/B: Imagine that you have just found out that the Governing Council of
the European Central Bank has unexpectedly announced that it is putting up the
policy rate by...
• weak treatment (WT): ...0.25 percentage points.
• strong treatment (ST): ...1.00 percentage point.
What impact does this information have on your expectations regarding the rate
of inflation over the next twelve months?
• I expect inflation to be lower
• It has no impact on my expectations
• I expect inflation to be higher
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The upper panel of Table 3 summarizes the answers. While Column (1) presents the
results for the combined treatments, Columns (2) and (3) report results for the weak and
strong treatments separately. Roughly 50% of individuals do not update their inflation
expectations in response to an unexpected increase in the policy rate. The fraction of
individuals who do not update expectations is somewhat lower in the treatment with
a stronger increase in the policy rate but still higher than the fraction of individuals
who change their inflation expectations upwards or downwards. Interestingly, in both
treatments the fraction of individuals who increase their inflation expectations is higher
than the fraction of those who decrease inflation expectations. Although this behaviour
is at odds with standard theory, it is has been previously observed for households and is
in line with an information effect of the increase in the interest rate, i.e., households infer
from the policy rate change that the central bank has a more positive view on the current
state of the economy than the household previously thought, see Eminidou et al. (2020)
or Enders et al. (2019) in the context of a firm survey.
The lower panel of Table 3 shows the results of ordered Probit regressions of the change
in the inflation expectation (adj infl exp) on the information channels and inflation expe-
rience while controlling for socio-economic characteristics. In all three columns, we report
marginal effects for the probability that a household increases its inflation expectation
in response to an unanticipated increase in the interest rate, i.e., for the response which
stands in contrast to standard theory. For the strong and the combined treatment, we
find that the direct ECB communication channel has a significant effect. Individuals who
rely on this channel are less likely to increase their inflation expectations in response to an
unexpected increase of the policy rate. This suggests that those who rely on direct ECB
communication channels entertain an economic model of the economy that is in line with
standard theory. In the weak treatment, using other channels increases the likelihood of
revising the inflation expectation upwards. Interestingly, neither the traditional nor social
media channel are important for the expectation updating.
Experience, however, is highly relevant for the updating behavior. Specifically, individ-
uals with higher inflation experience are more likely to revise their inflation expectations
upwards in response to an unexpected increase in the interest rate. A potential interpre-
tation could be that these households have experienced rising interest rates during times
of high inflation and hence mentally connect these two phenomena. Alternatively, there
could be a negative effect of high experienced inflation rates on the perception of the
ability of monetary policy to reduce inflation. In both cases, the inflation experience has
shaped the economic model which is entertained by individuals. Note that the estimate
of λ is now much smaller than in Column (5) of Table 2. This suggests that the lifetime
inflation experience which essentially applies equal weights to all experienced inflation
rates is most informative for understanding an individual’s updating behavior.
In the strong treatment, the east1989 dummy is significantly positive (see Table A.7 in
the Appendix). That is, individuals who lived in East Germany before the reunification are
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Table 3: Regressions of inflation updating on information channels and lifetime inflation
(1) (2) (3)
WT+ST WT ST
Panel A: Summary of Outcomes
lower expected inflation
586 274 312
(24.10%) (22.50%) (25.70%)
same expected inflation
1131 613 518
(46.50%) (50.33%) (42.67%)
higher expected inflation
715 331 384
(29.40%) (27.18%) (31.63%)
2432 1218 1214
Panel B: Ordered Probit Regression
adj infl exp
traditional -0.65 -2.90 1.44
(2.38) (3.31) (3.43)
social -0.86 2.07 -2.15
(3.73) (5.45) (5.28)
ecb -6.12* -4.85 -7.55*
(3.13) (4.34) (4.46)
other 3.62 6.16* 1.02
(2.43) (3.64) (3.28)
p˜ilti,2019 8.27*** 8.19** 9.55**
(2.80) (3.57) (4.66)
Observations 2,295 1,150 1,145
Controls Yes Yes Yes
λ 0.10 0.00 0.40
% correctly predicted 46.14 50.26 42.79
∆P(y = 1|X) 7.50 7.66 8.15
Notes: Upper panel: Absolute frequencies of the reactions to the ECB announcements for the full
sample, the ‘weak treatment group’ (WT) and the ‘strong treatment group’ (ST). Relative frequencies
conditional on treatment status are reported in parentheses. Lower panel: Average marginal effects for
an increase (=1) in adj infl exp from ordered Probit regressions of households’ inflation updating on
their sources of information about monetary policy, lifetime inflation and socio-economic characteristics.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. The reported average marginal
effects and standard errors are the estimated ones times 100. Asterisks ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ indicate signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. The estimation sample includes individuals with
−12 ≤ pii,t:t+12|t ≤ 12. In the second-to-last row, we report the fraction of correct predictions. In the last
row, we report the difference in the predicted probability of stating a one when comparing an individual
with inflation experience at the 90th percentile with an individual with experience at the 10th percentile.
more likely to expect the inflation rate to increase in response to a contractionary policy
shock. In contrast, individuals who plan to buy real estate are less likely to increase
their inflation expectations. This finding is in line with our previous result that those
individuals are more likely to follow direct communication channels of the ECB and,
hence, might have a better understanding of the effect of tighter monetary policy (see
Table 1).
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7 Conclusion
We interpret our findings as follows. Information channels provide households with infor-
mation about the level of inflation, where traditional media seems to be more accurate in
this respect. Perceived inflation and quantitative forecasts, which typically do not move
too far away from perceived inflation rates, are hence very dependent on the information
channel used. Lifetime inflation experience does not play an important role, arguably be-
cause this experience is not remembered in the form of numerical values. When forming
expectations about the direction of future inflation, however, experience plays a much
larger role, while information channels are less important. This finding is consistent with
the hypothesis that experiences, rather than information channels, influence individuals’
economic model, i.e., the way how agents think about the basic mechanics of the economy.
This is confirmed by our observations regarding the expected direction of the unemploy-
ment rate, and the answers to a thought experiment in which the European Central Bank
unexpectedly raises interest rates.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Variable construction
Variable Questionnaire Description
Socio-economic characteristics
age age Age of individual. Set to 80 if age equals ‘80 years or older’.
east1989 eastwest1989 Equals unity if eastwest1989 equals ‘East Germany’, and zero else.
female gender Equals unity if gender equals ‘female’, and zero else.
fullemploy employ Equals unity if employ equals ‘Employed, full-time’, and zero else.
hhsize hhsize Household size. Set to 6 if hhsize equals ‘6 or more’.
homebuy intbuyprop renter
(Q:003A) and int-
buyprop owner (Q:003B)
Equals unity if either intbuyprop renter or intbuyprop owner equal
‘yes’, and zero else.
income hhinc Monthly household income in 1.000 EUR based on interval mid-
points:

= 0.25 if hhinc equals ‘< 500 EUR’,
= 0.75 if hhinc equals ‘500 – < 1.000 EUR’,
= 1.25 if hhinc equals ‘1.000 – < 1.500 EUR’,
= 1.75 if hhinc equals ‘1.500 – < 2.000 EUR’,
= 2.25 if hhinc equals ‘2.000 – < 2.500 EUR’,
= 2.75 if hhinc equals ‘2.500 – < 3.000 EUR’,
= 3.25 if hhinc equals ‘3.000 – < 3.500 EUR’,
= 3.75 if hhinc equals ‘3.500 – < 4.000 EUR’,
= 4.25 if hhinc equals ‘4.000 – < 4.500 EUR’,
= 4.75 if hhinc equals ‘> 4.499 EUR’.
no property homeown Equals unity if homeown equals ‘rent and do not own any other
home(s)’, and zero else.
yoe eduschool Years of education of individual following SOEP-IS Group (2017):
= 7 if eduschool equals ’No school-leaving certificate’,
= 9 if eduschool equals ’Secondary school-leaving certificate’,
= 10 if eduschool equals ’Other school-leaving certificate’,
= 10 if eduschool equals ’Intermediate secondary school certificate’,
= 10 if eduschool equals ’Polytechnical secondary school certificate
(8th/10th grade)’,
= 13 if eduschool equals ’University of applied sciences entrance
diploma / completed technical school’,
= 13 if eduschool equals ’Senior school-leaving certificate/ general
or subject-specific university entrance diploma’,
= 18 if eduschool equals ’College / university degree’.
Information channels
traditional source mpecb a (Q:314) Equals unity if individual selects ‘Traditional media such as news-
papers, radio, television or the websites of such providers’ as one of
the channels through which he / she most often receives information
about the ECB’s monetary policy, and zero else.
social source mpecb b (Q:314) Equals unity if individual selects ‘Social media such as Facebook or
Twitter’, and zero else.
Notes: This table describes the construction of the variables used in the empirical analysis. In the middle column,
we refer to the names of the original variables as listed in the questionnaire for Wave 3 of the Bundesbank Online
Pilot Survey on Consumer Expectations.
20
Table A.2: Variable construction (cont.)
Variable Questionnaire Description
ecb source mpecb c (Q:314) Equals unity if individual selects ‘ECB communication channels (e.g.,
ECB’s website, ECB’s Economic Bulletin, ECB’s monthly press con-
ference)’, and zero else.
other source mpecb d (Q:314) Equals unity if individual selects ‘Other sources’, and zero else.
noinform source mpecb e (Q:314) Equals unity if individual selects ‘I do not follow the ECB’s monetary
policy’, and zero else.
Quantitative expectations
pii,t−12:t|t devinfpoint (Q:307) Perceived German inflation rate over the previous twelve months in
percent. This question was only asked to participants of Wave 3 of
the Bundesbank survey who did not already participate in Wave 2.
|ei,t−12:t|t| devinfpoint (Q:307) Perception error. Defined as |pii,t−12:t|t−1.4|, where 1.4 is the German
CPI inflation rate in May 2019.
pii,t:t+12|t infdef (Q:005A) and in-
flexppoint (Q:005B)
Expected German inflation rate over the next twelve months in per-
cent. Equals inflexppoint if infdef equals ‘Inflation’ and (−1)· in-
flexppoint if infdef equals ‘Deflation’.
σi,t:t+12|t infexprob a – infexprob j
(Q:308)
Standard deviation derived from the probabilities assigned to the
distinct outcome intervals (‘bins’) for the German inflation rate over
the next twelve months. We assume i) that the exterior bins have a
width of four percentage points and ii) that the probability mass in
each bin is located at the midpoint.
Qualitative expectations
infl exp expmacroquali e (Q:004) Expected development of the German inflation rate over the next
twelve months:
= −1 if expmacroquali e equals ‘decrease significantly’ or ‘decrease
slightly’,
= 0 if expmacroquali e equals ‘stay roughly the same’,
= 1 if expmacroquali e equals ‘increase slightly’ or ‘increase
significantly’.
unemp exp expmacroquali a (Q:004) Expected development of the German unemployment rate over the
next twelve months:
= −1 if expmacroquali a equals ‘decrease significantly’ or ‘decrease
slightly’,
= 0 if expmacroquali a equals ‘stay roughly the same’,
= 1 if expmacroquali a equals ‘increase slightly’ or ‘increase
significantly’.
Inflation updating
adj infl exp infexchange1 (Q:311A /
Q:311B)
Adjustment in inflation expectations over the next twelve months in
reaction to unexpected announcement that the Governing Council
of the ECB is putting up the policy rate by 0.25 (Q:311A) / 1.0
(Q:311B) percentage points:
= −1 if infexchange1 equals ‘lower expected inflation’,
= 0 if infexchange1 equals ‘same expected inflation’,
= 1 if infexchange1 equals ‘higher expected inflation’.
Notes: This table describes the construction of the variables used in the empirical analysis. In the middle column,
we refer to the names of the original variables as listed in the questionnaire for Wave 3 of the Bundesbank Online
Pilot Survey on Consumer Expectations. Question Q:307 is only assigned to individuals who did not also participate
in Wave 2.
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Table A.3: Summary statistics for socio-economic characteristics
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
age 2585 53.01 16.85 16 80
east1989 2583 0.14 0.35 0 1
female 2585 0.42 0.49 0 1
fullemploy 2585 0.43 0.50 0 1
hhsize 2580 2.24 1.08 1 6
homebuy 2584 0.22 0.41 0 1
income 2434 3.06 1.21 0.25 4.75
no property 2584 0.36 0.48 0 1
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the socio-
economic characteristics of the participants in Wave 3 of the Bun-
desbank Online Pilot Survey on Consumer Expectations. House-
hold income is expressed in 1,000 Euros. We consider only re-
sponses from households who revealed their information channels
of monetary policy.
Table A.4: Summary statistics for inflation expectations / uncertainty
Panel A: Quantitative expectations
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
pii,t−12:t|t 1389 2.53 1.95 -10.00 12.00
|ei,t−12:t|t| 1389 1.31 1.84 0.00 11.40
pii,t:t+12|t 2445 2.50 2.20 -12.00 12.00
σi,t:t+12|t 2443 1.60 1.82 0.00 12.07
Panel B: Qualitative expectations
Obs. −1 (decrease) 0 (same) 1 (increase)
infl exp 2443 80 856 1507
(3.27%) (35.04%) (61.69%)
unemp exp 2444 401 1198 845
(16.41%) (49.02%) (34.57%)
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the macroeconomic expecta-
tions of the participants in Wave 3 of the Bundesbank Online Pilot Survey on
Consumer Expectations. For pii,t−12:t|t and |ei,t−12:t|t|, we only consider house-
holds with −12 ≤ pii,t−12:t|t ≤ 12. For pii,t:t+12|t, infl exp and unemp exp, we only
consider households with −12 ≤ pii,t:t+12|t ≤ 12.
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Table A.5: Regressions of expectations on information channels and lifetime experience:
robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
|ei,t−12:t|t| pii,t:t+12|t ERPSi,t:t+12|t infl exp
traditional -0.13** -0.54** -0.05** -0.03
(0.06) (0.23) (0.03) (0.03)
social 0.03 0.41 0.10** 0.01
(0.09) (0.25) (0.04) (0.04)
ecb 0.14 -0.36 0.00 -0.06
(0.16) (0.23) (0.03) (0.04)
other -0.08** -0.10 -0.01 -0.02
(0.04) (0.17) (0.02) (0.03)
p˜ilti,2019 0.04 0.29 -0.15*** 1.44***
(0.08) (0.25) (0.02) (0.56)
pii,t−12:t|t 0.80*** 0.06*
(0.06) (0.04)
Constant 0.80 3.92*** 1.01***
(0.72) (1.16) (0.14)
Observations 1,309 1,309 2,317 2,305
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort dummies No No No Yes
λ 0.50 0.90 0.20 4.50
R¯2 0.77 0.06 0.04 –
% correctly predicted – – – 61.87
∆P(y = 1|X) – – – 36.30
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) present OLS estimates from regressions of households’ quan-
titative expectations on their sources of information about monetary policy, lifetime
inflation and socio-economic characteristics. Columns (1) and (2) include perceived
inflation as an additional covariate. In Column (3), we use the ‘expected ranked
probability score’ of Kru¨ger and Pavlova (2020) as an alternative measure of infla-
tion uncertainty. Column (4) presents average marginal effects for an increase (=1)
in expected inflation from ordered Probit regressions of households’ qualitative ex-
pectations on information channels, lifetime experience, socio-economic controls and
dummy variables for age cohorts. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Asterisks ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ indicate significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. The estimation sample in Column (1)
includes individuals with −12 ≤ pii,t−12:t|t ≤ 12. Columns (2) and (4) include those
with −12 ≤ pii,t:t+12|t ≤ 12. Column (3) includes all individuals.
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Table A.6: Regressions of expectations on information channels and lifetime experience:
control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pii,t−12:t|t |ei,t−12:t|t| pii,t:t+12|t σi,t:t+12|t infl exp unemp exp
traditional -0.55*** -0.57*** -0.51*** -0.34** -0.03 -0.02
(0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.03) (0.03)
social 0.16 0.15 0.27 0.54*** 0.01 0.05
(0.27) (0.25) (0.22) (0.20) (0.04) (0.04)
ecb 0.04 0.17 0.01 0.07 -0.06 0.05
(0.24) (0.21) (0.19) (0.17) (0.04) (0.04)
other -0.03 -0.10 0.06 -0.09 -0.02 0.07**
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03)
p˜ilti,2019 0.30 0.28 0.91 -0.70*** 0.45***
(0.31) (0.28) (0.73) (0.12) (0.13)
u˜lti,2019 0.11***
(0.02)
east1989 0.24 0.20 0.32** 0.09 0.07*** -0.06**
(0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.11) (0.03) (0.02)
female 0.53*** 0.64*** 0.36*** 0.21*** 0.05** -0.04**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
fullemploy -0.16 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 0.08*** 0.03
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
hhsize 0.12* 0.12** 0.14*** 0.05 0.03*** -0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
homebuy -0.05 -0.07 0.04 0.01 0.05* -0.01
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(income) -0.22 -0.37*** -0.28** -0.18** -0.09*** -0.01
(0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02)
no property 0.57*** 0.52*** 0.17 0.07 -0.01 0.01
(0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02)
yoe -0.03** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 3.96*** 3.97*** 3.66*** 5.06***
(1.11) (1.00) (1.23) (0.75)
Observations 1,309 1,309 2,307 2,317 2,305 2,306
λ 1.70 1.60 5.10 0.20 4.40 2.70
R¯2 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.04 – –
% correctly predicted – – – – 61.95 49.96
∆P(y = 1|X) – – – – 12.59 9.72
Notes: Columns (1)-(4) present OLS estimates from regressions of households’ quantitative expecta-
tions on their sources of information about monetary policy, lifetime inflation and socio-economic char-
acteristics. Columns (5)-(6) present average marginal effects for an increase (=1) in the respective
dependent variable from ordered Probit regressions of households’ qualitative expectations on informa-
tion channels, lifetime experience and socio-economic controls. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% critical level, respectively. The estimation sample in Columns (1) and (2) includes individuals with
−12 ≤ pii,t−12:t|t ≤ 12. Columns (3), (5) and (6) include those with −12 ≤ pii,t:t+12|t ≤ 12. Column
(4) includes all individuals. In the second-to-last row, we report the fraction of correct predictions for
each qualitative expectation. In the last row, we report the difference in the predicted probability of
stating a one when comparing an individual with experience at the 90th percentile with an individual
with experience at the 10th percentile.
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Table A.7: Regressions of inflation updating on information channels and lifetime infla-
tion: control variables
(1) (2) (3)
adj infl exp
WT+ST WT ST
traditional -0.65 -2.90 1.44
(2.38) (3.31) (3.43)
social -0.86 2.07 -2.15
(3.73) (5.45) (5.28)
ecb -6.12* -4.85 -7.55*
(3.13) (4.34) (4.46)
other 3.62 6.16* 1.02
(2.43) (3.64) (3.28)
p˜ilti,2019 8.27*** 8.19** 9.55**
(2.80) (3.57) (4.66)
east1989 3.66 -2.15 10.29***
(2.41) (2.99) (3.76)
female 0.07 0.10 0.22
(1.67) (2.28) (2.45)
fullemploy 0.84 1.05 1.57
(1.79) (2.40) (2.71)
hhsize -0.27 0.42 -0.97
(0.93) (1.24) (1.41)
homebuy -2.32 0.70 -5.31*
(2.15) (2.93) (3.13)
ln(income) -1.10 -2.67 0.33
(2.02) (2.63) (2.99)
no property -2.29 -0.38 -4.18
(1.87) (2.47) (2.86)
yoe 0.43* 0.35 0.52
(0.24) (0.33) (0.35)
Observations 2,295 1,150 1,145
λ 0.10 0.00 0.40
% correctly predicted 46.14 50.26 42.79
∆P(y = 1|X) 7.50 7.66 8.15
Notes: This table presents average marginal effects for an increase (=1) in adj infl exp from ordered Pro-
bit regressions of households’ inflation updating on their sources of information about monetary policy,
lifetime inflation and socio-economic characteristics. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses. The reported average marginal effects and standard errors are the estimated ones
times 100. Asterisks ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respec-
tively. The estimation sample includes individuals with −12 ≤ pii,t:t+12|t ≤ 12. In the second-to-last row,
we report the fraction of correct predictions. In the last row, we report the difference in the predicted
probability of stating a one when comparing an individual with inflation experience at the 90th percentile
with an individual with experience at the 10th percentile.
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